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
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(54) Method for verifying the expected postal security device in a postal security device

(57) A PSD has a private key which is associated with a specific public key that is stored in the host PC. The host PC sends the PSD public key private key to the PSD. If the PSD determines that the received PSD public key corresponds to its private key, the system has determined that the expected PSD is connected to the Host system and the PSD is activated to accept postal value requests from the host PC. Additionally, a PSD state identification, such as a checksum of a PSD transaction log file stored in the host may be verified by the PSD, which also has stored therein a PSD transaction log file. In this manner the PSD verifies that the PSD has performed all transactions with the host PC sending the checksum. Methods for verifying in the PSD that the expected host PC is coupled to the PSD mirrors the two embodiments for verifying the expected PSD.



## Description

The present invention relates generally to a system and method for postage metering security and, more particularly, to systems and methods for verifying authorized postal security devices.

The Information-Based Indicia Program (IBIP) is a distributed trusted system proposed by the United States Postal Service (USPS). The IBIP is expected to support new methods of applying postage in addition to, and eventually in lieu of, the current approach, which typically relies on a postage meter to mechanically print indicia on mailpieces. The IBIP requires printing large, high density, two dimensional (2-D) bar codes on mailpieces. The Postal Service expects the IBIP to provide cost-effective assurance of postage payment for each mailpiece processed.

The USPS has published draft specifications for the IBIP. The INFORMATION BASED INDICIA PROGRAM (IBIP) INDICIUM SPECIFICATION, dated June 13, 1996, defines the proposed requirements for a new indicium that will be applied to mail being processed using the IBIP. The INFORMATION BASED INDICIA PROGRAM POSTAL SECURITY DEVICE SPECIFICATION, dated June 13, 1996, defines the proposed requirements for a Postal Security Device (PSD) that will provide security services to support the creation of a new "information based" postage postmark or indicium that will be applied to mail being processed using the IBIP. The INFORMATION BASED INDICIA PROGRAM HOST SYSTEM SPECIFICATION, dated October 9, 1996, defines the proposed requirements for a host system element of the IBIP. The specifications are collectively referred to herein as the "IBIP Specifications". The IBIP includes interfacing user (customer), postal and vendor infrastructures which are the system elements of the program.

The user infrastructure, which resides at the user's site, comprises a postal security device (PSD) coupled to a host system. The PSD is a secure processor-based accounting device that dispenses and accounts for postal value stored therein. The host system may be a personal computer (PC) or a meter-based host processor. Among the various requirements set forth in the Host System Specification is that the host system verifies that the coupled PSD is "the expected PSD". Conventional postage metering devices and recent digital metering devices, such as PostPerfect and Personal Post Office, both manufactured by the assignee of the present invention, do not include such verification. Thus, a method for achieving such verification is desired.

U.S. Patent No. 5,510,992 discloses a method whereby the host PC verifies that a storage means that is coupled to the host PC and has postal value stored therein, is authorized for use with the host PC. The method comprises the steps of storing a unique identifier, such as a serial number, in the storage means

when the storage means is filled with postal value, and sending the unique identifier to the host PC when postage value is requested for dispensing. The host PC then verifies that the storage means is authorized for use with the host PC by confirming that the unique identifier retrieved from the storage device is the same as one stored in the host PC. Although such method verifies that the storage means is the expected storage device, the storage means is not a PSD because it is not a processor-based accounting device that dispenses and accounts for postal value stored therein. Furthermore, the verification of the serial number in the host PC is subject to fraud.

It has been found that the present invention provides a more secure and reliable system and method for verifying the expected PSD is coupled to the host PC. It has further been found that the present invention provides a secure and reliable system and method for verifying the expected host PC is coupled to the PSD.

The present invention provides a secure and reliable method for verifying in the host system that the expected PSD is coupled to the host system. In accordance with the present invention, the PSD has a private key which is associated with a specific public key that is stored in the host PC. The host PC sends the PSD public key to the PSD. If the PSD determines that the received PSD public key corresponds to its private key, the system has determined that the expected PSD is connected to the Host system and the PSD is activated to accept postal value requests from the host PC. Additionally, a PSD state identification, such as a checksum of a PSD transaction log file stored in the host may be verified by the PSD, which also has stored therein a PSD transaction log file. In this manner the PSD verifies that the PSD has performed all transactions with the host PC sending the checksum. A method for verifying that the expected host is coupled to the PSD mirrors the method for verifying the expected PSD.

The above and other objects and advantages of the present invention will be apparent upon consideration of the following detailed description, taken in conjunction with accompanying drawings, in which like reference characters refer to like parts throughout, and in which:

Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a postage metering system in accordance with the present invention showing a process for storing keys in a host system and a PSD coupled thereto;

Fig. 2 is a flow chart showing an alternate process for storing keys in a host system and a PSD coupled thereto;

Fig. 3 is a flow chart of a preferred method for verifying the expected PSD is coupled to the host system;

Fig. 4 is a flow chart of showing a method corresponding to that of Fig. 3 for verifying the expected host system;

Fig. 5 is a flow chart of an alternate method for ver-

ifying the expected PSD is coupled to the host system; and

Fig. 6 is a flow chart of showing an alternate method corresponding to that of Fig. 5 for verifying the expected host system.

In describing the present invention, reference is made to the drawings, wherein there is seen system and methods for verifying the expected postal security device in a host system and conversely verifying the expected host system. Referring now to Fig. 1, a postage metering system, generally designated 10, includes a Host PC 20 coupled to a PSD 30, a Data Center 40 and a manufacturer 50. The manufacturer 50 initializes PSD 30 with an identification number, such as PSD ID 32, and a cryptographic key, such as PSD private key 34. The manufacturer 50 also sends the PSD ID 32 and a cryptographic key corresponding to the key in the PSD 30, such as PSD public key 36, to the Data Center 40. The Data Center 40 then sends the PSD ID 32 and the public key 36, to the Host PC 20. For the purpose of describing the present invention, the PSD private and public keys are stored in PSD 30 and Host PC 20 respectively. It will be understood that a secret key shared by the Host PC and the PSD may be used in place of such key pair.

The Host PC 20 and PSD 30 each include a micro-processor and memory (not shown). The Host PC 20 further includes a message generator 22 for generating a message. The message may be a random number or may include data indicating status of the PSD, for example a checksum 24 of PSD transaction records stored a log files in Host PC 20. For the following description of the present invention checksums will be used. The PSD records stored in Host PC 20 correspond to PSD records stored in PSD 30 for each transaction by PSD 30. For a more detailed description of such storage of PSD records see European Patent Publication Number 0780808, assigned to the assignee of the present invention, and incorporated herein by reference.

Referring now to Fig. 2, an alternate method for initializing the PSD with a cryptographic key is shown. At step 100, Host PC 20 generates a secret key or a key pair. The key or key pair is stored in Host PC 20, at step 105. Host PC 20 then sends the secret key or one of the keys of the key pair to PSD 30, at step 110. PSD 30 stores the key received from Host PC 20, at step 115.

Referring now to Fig. 3, a method is shown for verifying that the expected PSD 30 is coupled to Host PC 20. At step 200, the Host PC sends the PSD public key stored in the Host PC to the PSD. At step 210, the PSD determines if the public key received is the public key corresponding to the PSD private key stored in the PSD. If not, then, at step 230, an error is flagged that the expected PSD is not coupled to the Host PC. If the public key received does correspond to the PSD private key in PSD 30, then, at step 240, the expected PSD has been verified and the PSD is activated for IBIP process-

ing.

Referring now to Fig. 4, it may be required that, in addition to verifying the expected PSD, the system verify the expected Host PC. In the preferred embodiment of the present invention, such verification of the expected Host PC mirrors the process for verifying the expected PSD as set forth above. At step 300, the PSD sends the Host PC public key stored in the PSD to the Host PC. At step 310, the Host PC determines if the public key received is the public key corresponding to the Host PC private key stored in the Host PC. If not, then, at step 330, an error is flagged that the expected Host PC is not coupled to the PSD. If the public key received does correspond to the Host PC private key in Host PC 20, then, at step 340, the expected Host PC has been verified.

Referring now to Fig. 5, an alternate method for verifying the expected PSD is shown. At step 400, the Host PC generates a message. In accordance with the present invention, the message may be in the form of a checksum of a PSD transaction log stored in the Host PC or any other PSD state identification that corresponds to data also stored in the PSD. The Host PC encrypts the message with the PSD public Key, at step 405, and sends the message to the PSD, at step 410. At step 415, the PSD decrypts the received encrypted message, such as the checksum. At step 420, the PSD generates a checksum of the transaction log stored in the PSD (or other PSD state identification corresponding to the message generated by the Host PC). At step 425, the PSD compares the decrypted checksum received with the checksum generated by the PSD. If the checksums are not the same, then an error is flagged, at step 430, indicating that there is a discrepancy between the PSD logs stored in the Host PC and the PSD. If the checksums are the same then, at step 435, the PSD is activated for IBIP processing.

Referring now to Fig. 6, an alternate method for the PSD verifying that the expected Host PC is coupled to the PSD is shown which mirrors the process for verifying the expected PSD as shown in Fig. 5.

At step 500, the PSD generates a message in the form of a checksum of the PSD transaction log stored in the PSD or any other PSD state identification that corresponds to data also stored in the Host PC. The PSD encrypts the message with the Host PC public Key, at step 505, and sends the message to the Host PC, at step 510. At step 515, the Host PC decrypts the received encrypted message, such as the checksum. At step 520, the Host PC generates a checksum of the PSD transaction log stored in the Host PC (or other PSD state identification corresponding to the message generated by the PSD). At step 525, the Host PC compares the decrypted checksum received with the checksum generated by the Host PC. If the checksums are not the same, then an error is flagged, at step 530, indicating that there is a discrepancy between the PSD logs stored in the Host PC and the PSD. If the checksums

are the same then, at step 535, the Host PC has been verified as the expected Host PC.

It has been found that the present invention is suitable for use with any security device that is coupled to a host system in an unsecured manner. For example, the present invention could be used for a certificate metering system such as disclosed in European Patent Publication Number 0762692, filed August 21, 1996, assigned to the assignee of the present invention and incorporated herein by reference.

While the present invention has been disclosed and described with reference to specific embodiments thereof, it will be apparent, as noted above, that variations and modifications may be made therein. It is, thus, intended in the following claims to cover each variation and modification, including a certificate metering system, that falls within the true spirit and scope of the present invention.

#### Claims

1. A method for verifying that a postal security device (PSD) is the expected PSD for a host system, the method comprising the steps of:

storing at least the private key of a cryptographic key pair in the PSD;  
sending from the host system to the PSD a first public key stored in the host system; and  
verifying in the PSD that the first public key received from the host system is the public key of the key pair.

2. The method of claim 1 further comprising the step of:

activating the PSD for transaction processing when the first public key is the public key of the key pair.

3. A method for verifying that a postal security device (PSD) is the expected PSD for a host system, the method comprising the steps of:

storing a cryptographic key pair in the PSD, the cryptographic key pair including a private key and a first public key;  
sending from the host system to the PSD at least a portion of a second public key stored in the host system; and  
verifying in the PSD that the portion of the second public key received from the host system corresponds to the first public key.

4. The method of claim 3 further comprising the step of:

activating the PSD for transaction processing

when the first public key is the same as the second public key.

5. A postage metering system comprising:

a host system having stored therein a first public key;  
a postal security device (PSD) coupled to said host system, said PSD having stored therein at least a private key of a key pair; and  
wherein said PSD includes means for verifying that said first public key is the public key of the key pair.

6. A method for verifying that a postal security device (PSD) is the expected PSD and that the PSD has not completed transactions with any other host system, the method comprising the steps of:

generating a first message in the host system, said first message representing a predetermined status of the PSD after the previous transaction between the host system and the PSD;

encrypting the first message with an encryption key stored in the host system;  
sending the encrypted first message to the PSD;

decrypting the encrypted first message with a decryption key stored in the PSD;

generating a second message in the PSD, said second message representing the predetermined status of the PSD after the previous transaction between the host system and the PSD; and

comparing the second message to the decrypted first message.

7. The method of claim 6 further comprising the step of

activating the PSD for transaction processing when the second message is the same as the decrypted first message.

8. The method of claim 6 wherein the first message generated includes data indicating status of the PSD based on PSD transaction records stored in the host system.

9. The method of claim 1 or 3 or 6 wherein the host system is a personal computer.

10. The method of claim 6 wherein the first and second identification numbers include at least one of a checksum, control sum, ascending register, descending register and random number from the previous transaction.

11. The system of claim 6 wherein the decryption key and encryption key are identical.
12. The system of claim 6 wherein the decryption key and the encryption key are different. 5
13. The system of claim 6 wherein the decryption key is a private key of a key pair and the encryption key is a public key of the key pair. 10
14. The method of claim 8 wherein the data indicating status of the PSD is a checksum of PSD transaction records.
15. A method for verifying that a postal security device (PSD) is the expected PSD for a host system and that the host system is the expected host system for the PSD, the method comprising the steps of: 15
- storing at least a first private key of a first cryptographic key pair in the PSD; 20
  - storing at least a second private key of a second cryptographic key pair in the host system;
  - sending from the host system to the PSD a public key stored in the host system; 25
  - verifying in the PSD that the public key stored in the host system is a first public key of the first key pair;
  - sending from the PSD to the host system a public key stored in the PSD; and 30
  - verifying in the host system that the public key stored in the PSD is a second public key of the second key pair;
16. The method of claim 15 further comprising the step of: 35
- activating the PSD for transaction processing when the public key stored in the host is the public key of the first key pair and the public key stored in the PSD is the public key of the second key pair. 40

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FIG. 1




FIG. 2




FIG. 3




FIG. 4




FIG. 5








FIG. 6





Europäisches Patentamt  
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(30) Priority: 21.11.1996 US 754568


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EP 0 845 762 A3



European Patent  
Office

# EUROPEAN SEARCH REPORT

Application Number  
EP 97 12 0461

DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT			
Category	Citation of document with indication, where appropriate, of relevant passages	Relevant to claim	CLASSIFICATION OF THE APPLICATION (Int.Cl.6)
Y	"Information Based Indicia Program Host System Specification [Draft]" 9 October 1996 (1996-10-09), UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE XP002137990 * page 7, paragraph 3.1.2 *	1,5	G07B17/00
A	---	2-4,15,16	
Y	EP 0 661 844 A (IBM) 5 July 1995 (1995-07-05) * column 2, line 20 - line 34 *	1	
Y	---	5	
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A	---	1-5,15,16	
A	"Information Based Indicia Program PSD Specification [Draft]" 13 June 1996 (1996-06-13), UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE XP002137734 * page 2-1, line 1-15 *	1-5,15,16	
A	---	1-5,15,16	TECHNICAL FIELDS SEARCHED (Int.Cl.6) G07B
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A	---	1-5,15,16	
A	WO 88 01818 A (WRIGHT ET AL.) 10 March 1988 (1988-03-10) * page 19, line 27 - page 22, line 4 *	1-5,15,16	
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-The present search report has been drawn up for all claims			
Place of search <b>THE HAGUE</b>		Date of completion of the search <b>31 May 2000</b>	Examiner <b>Schofield, C</b>
<p>CATEGORY OF CITED DOCUMENTS</p> <p>X : particularly relevant if taken alone Y : particularly relevant if combined with another document of the same category A : technological background O : non-written disclosure P : intermediate document</p> <p>T : theory or principle underlying the invention E : earlier patent document, but published on, or after the filing date D : document cited in the application L : document cited for other reasons &amp; : member of the same patent family, corresponding document</p>			

EPO FORM 100 (03.03.95) (P04C11)



European Patent  
Office

Application Number

EP 97 12 0461

#### CLAIMS INCURRING FEES

The present European patent application comprised at the time of filing more than ten claims.

- ☐ Only part of the claims have been paid within the prescribed time limit. The present European search report has been drawn up for the first ten claims and for those claims for which claims fees have been paid, namely claim(s):
- ☐ No claims fees have been paid within the prescribed time limit. The present European search report has been drawn up for the first ten claims.

#### LACK OF UNITY OF INVENTION

The Search Division considers that the present European patent application does not comply with the requirements of unity of invention and relates to several inventions or groups of inventions, namely:

see sheet 8

- ☐ All further search fees have been paid within the fixed time limit. The present European search report has been drawn up for all claims.
- ☐ As all searchable claims could be searched without effort justifying an additional fee, the Search Division did not invite payment of any additional fee.
- ☐ Only part of the further search fees have been paid within the fixed time limit. The present European search report has been drawn up for those parts of the European patent application which relate to the inventions in respect of which search fees have been paid, namely claims:
- ☒ None of the further search fees have been paid within the fixed time limit. The present European search report has been drawn up for those parts of the European patent application which relate to the invention first mentioned in the claims, namely claims:

1-5, 15, 16



European Patent  
Office

LACK OF UNITY OF INVENTION  
SHEET B

Application Number  
EP 97 12 0461

The Search Division considers that the present European patent application does not comply with the requirements of unity of invention and relates to several inventions or groups of inventions, namely:

1. Claims: 1-5,15,16

A method for verifying that a PSD is the expected PSD for a host system using private and public key cryptography.

2. Claims: 6-8, 10-14

A method for verifying that a PSD is the expected PSD for a host system and that the PSD has not completed transactions with any other host system.

**ANNEX TO THE EUROPEAN SEARCH REPORT  
ON EUROPEAN PATENT APPLICATION NO.**

EP 97 12 0461

This annex lists the patent family members relating to the patent documents cited in the above-mentioned European search report. The members are as contained in the European Patent Office EDP file on The European Patent Office is in no way liable for these particulars which are merely given for the purpose of information.

31-05-2000

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For more details about this annex : see Official Journal of the European Patent Office, No. 12/82

**ANNEX TO THE EUROPEAN SEARCH REPORT  
ON EUROPEAN PATENT APPLICATION NO.**

EP 97 12 0461

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